In the maze of Middle Eastern geopolitics, alliances shift like desert dunes, leaving the unprepared lost and the prescient well-positioned. The West finds itself in the former category.
In this photo provided by the Saudi Press Agency, SPA, leaders of Arab countries pose for a group ... [+]
Twelve years after Syria's expulsion from the Arab League as a consequence of brutally suppressing pro-democracy protests, President Bashar al-Assad has made a bold return to the regional stage.
During the summit, Assad launched a blistering attack on Ottoman ideology, thinly disguising his criticism of Turkish foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This rhetoric struck a chord with countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as it aligned with their own opposition to “Turkish expansionism” and the Muslim Brotherhood.
While this calculated move may be perceived as an attempt to forge new directions for Syria and its neighbors, a closer examination of realpolitik reveals a multifaceted narrative that goes beyond the high rhetoric of domestic domination and Arab solidarity.
Bilateral, regional and global reasons for Assad’s rehabilitation
The thawing of relationships with Assad is not an isolated incident, nor is it a decision taken lightly. The motivations behind this move are multi-layered, ranging from bilateral to international concerns. Countries are not merely looking to 'mend faces' with Assad, but to reposition themselves within the shifting sands of Middle Eastern politics.
At the bilateral level, Saudi Arabia seeks to limit Iran's growing influence. The endgame is not just a check on the Iranian military, but also a clampdown on the widespread trafficking of captagon, a powerful amphetamine that the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports has reached a record level in the Middle East, with Syria lying at the core of the problem. Egypt, on the other hand, is keen on preserving Arab sovereignty against the creeping influence of non-Arab powers—Turkey, Iran, and Russia.
Turkey, a significant player in the tumultuous politics of the region, aims for a resolution to repatriate Syrian refugees and to roll back the advances of the Syrian Kurds. The confluence of such varied interests provides a unique backdrop for the emerging alliance.
Regionally, the broader rapprochement withs Syria has led to a dwindling of Turkey’s leverage on Syria. The Gulf states' shifting stance on Iran while normalizing relations with Syria presents a concerning development for actors such as the U.S., Turkey and Israel. The changing dynamics mean that Ankara can no longer exercise the same level of influence as before.
Globally, the situation is even more intriguing, as the traditional superpower, the United States, continues to draw down its footprint—its presence is now mostly military. Meanwhile, Russia and China have moved in to fill the void, increasing their own footprints and effectively reshaping the geopolitics of the Middle East. The US allies in the region adroitly positioning themselves for the changes to come.
3D Render of a Topographic Map of Middle East. All source data is in the public domain. Color ... [+]
Four waves of normalisation in the Middle East
The Middle East's recent history can be charted through four waves of normalization. The first wave saw Arab nations coming together, driven by a shared desire to rectify the fragmentation that has plagued the region for far too long. This era of intra-Arab rapprochement has most vividly been witnessed in the Gulf, where old adversaries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar moved dialogue and diplomacy.
The second wave saw Arab nations reaching out to Israel, a seismic shift epitomised by the Abraham Accords. A testament to pragmatism overcoming prejudice, the Accords marked a tectonic shift in the region's geopolitical landscape, realigning alliances and opening up possibilities for economic and social engagement.
The third wave has seen Arab nations engaging with traditional regional rivals—Iran and Turkey. The potential Saudi-Iranian normalization of relations and Turkey’s reconciliation with Gulf countries serve as notable examples. This wave is still in its infancy, yet its potential to reshape regional relations is undeniable.
The fourth and current wave of normalization marks the Arab world's attempt to reincorporate Syria. Assad’s return to the Arab League can be seen as the culmination of these four waves, a tacit acknowledgment that problems with Syria’s cannot be solved without Syria at the table.
Problems with deploying diplomacy to bolster opposition groups
The expulsion of Assad's Syria from the Arab League over a decade ago was hailed as a decisive action by Western powers, a symbolic move to delegitimize his rule and bolster the opposition. However, in reality, it achieved little for the Syrian opposition. The expulsion did not necessarily make things easier for them or tilt the balance of power in their favor.
The League’s decision echoed the Western strategy of recognizing opposition forces as "legitimate representatives" of the Syrian people. Similar to actions taken against Venezuela to support the opposition leader, Juan Guaidó.
Venezuela and Syria flags together relations textile cloth, fabric texture
Legitimacy on Trial: Syria and Venezuela
This recognition of opposition groups was not just symbolic. The West wanted to convey that these opposition groups, despite not governing on the ground, were the "real" representatives of the people. A neat idea, but it was a fiction. The idea faltered both in Venezuela and Syria. The fundamental flaw? The assumption that the opposition groups automatically held democratic legitimacy. They did not. The reality is complex. The governments might be illegitimate and bypass their people's will, but it doesn't automatically confer legitimacy to those opposing them.
Moreover, the West’s policy of recognizing opposition groups as legitimate representatives has been riddled with inconsistencies. Not every opposition group across the globe receives the nod of approval. The recognition is selective, biased, and at times, starkly contradictory. For instance, the West swiftly recognized the Syrian opposition umbrella group by the end of 2011. In stark contrast, the administration of North East Syria, their military ally against the Islamic State, remains unrecognized. This group is conspicuously absent from international platforms discussing Syria's future.
The case of Syria: The recognition of the Syrian opposition by Western powers commenced in the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. In August 2011, the United States imposed sanctions on Syria and publicly stated that Bashar al-Assad had lost legitimacy. It wasn't until November 2012 that the more concrete step was taken. At that time, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was formed and it wasn't long before this group was recognised by numerous Western countries.
On November 13, 2012, France became the first Western country to formally recognize the Coalition as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Over the next few months, other Western nations followed suit. By the end of 2012, the Coalition was recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and several other European countries, representing a total of more than 20 Western nations. Despite this recognition, the National Coalition struggled to establish control on the ground, and the Assad government maintained its power.
The case of Venezuela: The crisis in Venezuela is another prime example of the West recognizing the opposition as the legitimate representative of the people. The contested presidential election in 2018, in which Nicolás Maduro claimed victory, was widely considered fraudulent by Western nations.
Guaidó, the leader of the opposition, declared himself interim president on January 23, 2019, a move that was quickly recognized by the United States and Canada. The following month, most European Union member states recognized Guaidó as the interim president, increasing the total number of Western countries recognizing Guaidó to over 25.
However, Maduro continued to hold power, supported by the military and allies such as Russia and China. Guaidó's interim government struggled to effect change on the ground, mirroring the scenario in Syria.
Lessons for opposition movements
In both cases, it is clear that deploying diplomacy as a tool to bolster the opposition and topple unfriendly regimes has proven ineffective, if not downright counterproductive. The attempts to delegitimize Assad's regime only ended up enhancing his reputation among some quarters as the beleaguered bulwark against foreign meddling. The tactic, initially seen as a masterstroke, has revealed itself to be a miscalculation.
This flawed approach should serve as a case study for resistance movements and oppositions around the world. It demonstrates the limits and effects of foreign diplomacy on internal conflicts. The key lesson to be drawn from this is that opposition groups should prioritize the domestic balance of power and internal struggle rather than relying primarily on external support or recognition.
The way forward for the West in Syria
In hindsight, it is also painfully clear that foreign intervention did not yield the desired results for Syrians. However, North East Syria is the only region where intervention has yielded some semblance of success, though the Western record is far from unblemished.
In this shifting scenario, the West must reassess its approach. The target: integration and consolidation of its positions in the North East, once the stronghold of Islamic State. A full shift must occur: the initial military cooperation against the IS should evolve into a lasting political alliance. It's not a task for the faint-hearted, but the political gains could be monumental, forging a new frontier of influence in this region.
The logical next phase is to secure Turkey's assent for the integration of its northern territories with the north east. Envisage a diplomatic marriage of convenience, initiated by commercial links and coordination. This is not fantasy but a stark necessity: a consolidation of the north east and the creation of a new geopolitical entity—a Turkish-Kurdish-Arab crescent. This bloc could effectively counterbalance other regional powers.
The root of Middle East's chronic ailments lies, in no small measure, in the fragmented and often contradictory policy the Washington has adopted for Syria and the larger region. It's a tale of waning influence and failed promises. The lessons are clear: cohesive policy and reliable action are necessary to regain their footing in this arena.
